



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## III

From the above discussion of the elementary nature of values, it may be seen that the adoption of such a psychological basis of values opens up a broad field of investigation. First, there is the problem of the origin of values. When does an individual begin to value? Or, in other words, when can we say that more is present than causality in the relation of a living organism to its environment? These questions demand biological, as well as psychological treatment.

Again, another important branch of the subject has to do with the interrelation of values in respect to knowledge. Here, distinguishing between standpoints of the individual and of an observer, we must determine what values are related to each standpoint, and how the individual himself may, in the course of evolution, come to observe by making his own judgments. Interesting questions also arise as to the values of true and false judgments. It is susceptible of proof that some false judgments are of contributory value.

Another fertile field of investigation has to do with the interrelation of immediate and contributory values in the experience of a mature individual. Since conscious activity is always both cognitive and affective, objects and acts are valued at the same time in both an immediate and a contributory way. Due to this fact are many interrelations of coexistent values. This topic also demands biological treatment, and a consideration of the relation of man to his environment in terms of value.

Finally, when an empirical theory of values has been developed, it is desirable to make a careful analysis of the transcendental speculations of Rickert, Windelband, Münsterberg, and others, in order to determine just where their views diverge from an empirical account of values.

In consideration of the foregoing programme and from his own meditation on these subjects, the writer believes that the study of values, far from having been completed in the existing literature, is yet in its youth.

MAURICE PICARD.

GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

---

## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Rousseau and Romanticism.* IRVING BABBITT. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1919. Pp. xxiii + 426.

There was once upon a time a classic art, inspired by men of the type of Aristotle, or even better Buddha, and one may add Christ. This art was "highly imaginative;" only this imagination was kept

within bounds by "reason," "decorum," "judgment," "common sense." After many centuries, however, the last named tried to raise its head again to put a stop to the orgy of "emotional individualism;" this movement of sound reaction crystallized and assumed the form of Neo-classicism. But Neo-classicism would not do, for this reason that it banished "fancy," or "imagination" altogether, as being—so they thought—incompatible with "judgment." Then came what Professor Babbitt calls "Rousseauism" or "Romanticism," which is a reaction against that Neo- or Pseudo-classicism. The remedy proved more dangerous than the evil; indeed this remedy was most terrible according to Professor Babbitt, who hurls to-day his fourth volume against the monster: so, if this "menace to civilization"—as Romanticism is called repeatedly—is not avoided, nobody surely can blame Professor Babbitt. The last volume is the most formidable that has come yet from the pen of the Harvard professor; but the ammunition seems to be inexhaustible, and there is no reason why this should be the last volume if the Hindenburg Line of Rousseauism still dares to resist.

Let the reader not imagine that this is a mere figure of speech. No indeed: for, after having shown Rousseau or Rousseauism as the evil force behind Chateaubriand, Musset, Hugo, Baudelaire, Renan, Goethe, Schiller, Schlegel, Wordsworth, Byron, Blake, *etc., etc., etc.* (as a matter of fact, it would be shorter to tell those who are not infected, and our author is perfectly neutral in administering his blows) Professor Babbitt arrives through Preraphaelites, Ruskin, Tolstoi, Nietzsche, Pragmatism, Neo-realism, Bergsonism, to "Kultur;" what civilization fought behind the Hindenburg Line was Rousseauism; the megalomania of the Kaiser was Rousseauism; the Big Bertha was, if not the direct product of Rousseauism, at least that of Baconianism with which Rousseauism is closely connected. "If men had not been so heartened by scientific progress they would have been less ready, we may be sure, to listen to Rousseau when he affirmed that they were naturally good" (p. 122; *cf.* 63, 64, 119, 345). Or again: "The attitude of the Romanticist to make of nature the mere plaything of his mood" is "closely connected with the dehumanizing of man by science that is reflected in a whole literature during the last half of the nineteenth century—for instance in so-called 'impassive writers' like Flaubert and Leconte de Lisle" (p. 299).

Professor Babbitt is surely an interesting case: fully 360 out of 400 pages are devoted to demolishing purposes and the forty left do not propose to offer any original doctrine.<sup>1</sup> The author in his de-

<sup>1</sup> One of the last Rousseauists, according to Professor Babbitt, is Bergson, and it is in discussing Bergson that the author's own belief comes out as clearly

structive fanaticism reminds one a little of the French poetess Mme. Ackerman, who had found all sorts of reasons for not believing in God, but could not let him go, for she would have missed him so much as a target for her imprecations; or, even more of Flaubert, who was heartily disgusted with Mr. Homais and the "bourgeois," but was so fascinated by them that he spent the best of his energies analyzing and savagely attacking them. Why he never occupied his mind with gentlemen that satisfied his own heart, is as hard to explain as why Professor Babbitt does not write books on Aristotle, or Buddha, or Christ. It must be the case of the bird flying right into the mouth of the monster snake that terrifies it and perhaps fascinates it.

It must be that. For, otherwise, one could not see how a man of the indisputable dialectic power of Professor Babbitt would use, at times, arguments so easy and so unconvincing as, *e. g.*, that of Chateaubriand, "quite overcome by his own uniqueness and wonderfulness," or Hugo "positively stupefied at the immensity of his own genius." Such eloquence may be pardonable in University Extension lectures, but produces a rather painful impression in a book meant for serious reading. Even more are we surprised to find Professor Babbitt spend so much time on the argument that "the belief that the latest thing is the best" is absurd. We could forgive Wolsley for saying in 1686: "Every ass that's romantic believes he is inspired"—in 1919 it is a waste to devote so many pages to the development of such a truism. Elsewhere we simply can not believe that Professor Babbitt did not understand that there is some beauty after all in Chanticleer's refusal to give up his faith that he can have a share in bringing about some of the light and beauty of the world. And is it not surprising that Professor Babbitt should not take *cum grano salis* Musset's "*Vive le mélodrame où Margot a pleuré*," but prefers to take the attitude of a methodist minister? Again, is it altogether fair to abuse Chateaubriand, and Rousseau, and the Romanticists alone, because they express regret at not having conquered their passions: what of Saint Paul's: "the good which I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do," or of Ovid's *Meliora probo sed deteriora sequor*—Ovid, dear to Professor Babbitt's heart?

Many, many more remarks of this kind could be added. But enough has been said with regard to the methods of Professor Babbitt—which does not prevent his book from being at times very stimulating and suggesting altogether a lofty view of life. Taking as anywhere: to the Intuitionism of Bergson, he wants to oppose "Insight" (p. 372)—"insight into the universal" if you please (p. 18). He calls his idea also "complete Positivism" (p. x); and it means the *mediocritas aurea* between judgment and fancy.

now the volume for what it purports to be, chiefly destructive, let us examine briefly, first Professor Babbitt's attitude towards Rousseau, and then Professor Babbitt's attitude towards Romanticism.

*The Attitude towards Rousseau.*—Professor Babbitt admits that some people may draw wrong impressions from his statements, and acknowledges that Rousseau was perhaps not quite so bad as readers may gather from his book. This is not enough. Make all allowances you will to the requirements of clear argument, all the allowances you wish for some heat in discussing, Professor Babbitt has lacked fairness to a point not permissible to a scholar. In the first place, when he refers to the writings of Rousseau, Professor Babbitt does not make the slightest distinction between statements in which Rousseau meant to express his philosophical convictions, and those in which he regards himself as a man and speaks of his private likings and personal tastes. For instance, in quoting the *Confessions* and the four *Lettres à Malesherbes* Professor Babbitt is not the conscientious scholar we would expect him to be when he consistently ignores the fact that Rousseau wrote partly, and even chiefly, to explain his case in the famous quarrel with the Encyclopedists, and his difficulties in having *Emile* published. Even suppose Rousseau was the worst rascal imaginable, and that he and not his enemies had tampered with written documents, it would still be illegitimate to draw on his character to abuse his doctrine—and this is what Babbitt does all the time when he takes passages in the *Confessions* in which Rousseau explains his life, as illustrating Rousseau the philosopher. Has Rousseau not a right to say that he is different from others? Since Professor Babbitt grants that Rousseau himself insists that this being different does not imply superiority (p. 50), why does Professor Babbitt speak of Rousseau's "gloating sense of his otherwiseness"? Can this passionate language to attack a man for his passion ever inspire confidence to an impartial reader? Moreover does not Rousseau rather warn others not to be as he was; does he not blame the absurd education which his father gave him and which made him the romantic dreamer that Professor Babbitt reproaches him for being? Furthermore, because Rousseau was a dreamer at times, and wrote he liked revery, Professor Babbitt has no right to infer that Rousseau advocated a substitution of meditations by dreamery as a principle of life or even as a principle of philosophy. On page 375 Professor Babbitt says: "Rousseau would have us get rid of analysis in favor of the heart!"—and then he himself speaks of different meanings of the word heart: why does Professor Babbitt take the heart of Rousseau as a romantic heart in the sense he, Professor Babbitt, imagines it to be, and not as Rousseau himself defines

it, limits it? Is it true or is it not true that the whole *First Discourse* which brought fame to Rousseau, is directed against the lack of restraint of his contemporaries (against the "romanticism" of his contemporaries, according to the definition of Professor Babbitt) in favor of Roman Virtue? Is it true or is it not true that in the *Nouvelle Héloïse* Rousseau devotes about two thirds of the book to condemning the vagaries of a youthful and romantic passion, the passion of Saint Preux for Julie? But Professor Babbitt seems to have seen only the "*âcre baiser*" (p. 216); the only real difference the writer can see between Rousseau and Professor Babbitt in this matter is that Rousseau is the more puritanic preacher of the two. Again is it true or is it not true that *Emile* is all directed against the influence of the romantic society of the time and toward the development of perfect self-control of the child's nature? Is it true or is it not true also that the whole of the *Contrat Social* is an awkward attempt to guard men from falling a prey to the natural and romantic desire for absolute individualism? Professor Babbitt has foreseen at least some objection here to his statements. But listen how he meets the difficulty; this passage is quite typical of Professor Babbitt: "Rousseau transforms conscience itself from an inner check into an expansive emotion [which of course is not true at all]. While thus corrupting conscience in its very essence he does not deny conscience, *on the contrary, he grows positively rhapsodic over conscience and similar words . . . in short Rousseau displays the usual dexterity of the sophist in juggling with ill-defined terms*" (p. 179—the italics are ours). Now, if we knew not that Professor Babbitt is just absolutely blinded with his preconceived idea of Rousseau we would have no other word but bad faith to define such a statement. As a matter of fact Professor Babbitt knows well that Rousseau is not a mere "juggler" or a "sophist;" otherwise would he not feel it to be below his dignity to devote so much energy in attacking him? And indeed, if one comes right down to facts, I think Rousseau's calvinism (for that method of Professor Babbitt's of ignoring Rousseau the calvinist and recognizing only the romantic traits is untenable) is about as near Professor Babbitt's puritanism or classicism as any ethical doctrine can be.

If Professor Babbitt had told us: "People who read Rousseau are more interested in his presentation of the romantic point of view and ignore his refutation of it," we would say: "Well and good; it is true!" But then why not give Rousseau the benefit of the misunderstanding, and merely say that Rousseau may be responsible for that misinterpretation because Rousseau did not make his point clear enough? But to say that this was Rousseau's own point of view is

not fair. Why does Professor Babbitt not remember that men like Faguet and like Dide and like Vallette and like Masson lay stress on that calvinistic side of Rousseau and make him the worst foe of individualism that ever was. Rousseau did attack, of course, the false decorum of neo-classicism (just as Professor Babbitt in his Chapter I.), but to make this mean that he advocated the wild romanticism described by Professor Babbitt is like saying that because a man is not an automobile manufacturer, he is selling shoes. To sum up: if Professor Babbitt is right in saying: "One should not, like Rousseau and the Romanticists, judge of decorum by what it degenerated into" (p. 24), we must say just as emphatically: "One should not, as Professor Babbitt, judge of Rousseauism by what it degenerated into."

*Professor Babbitt's Attitude towards Romanticism.*—To get right to the heart of the matter, we will say that Professor Babbitt has failed in a remarkable degree to make use of what we call nowadays historical sense. His definition of Romanticism is given on p. 4: "A thing is romantic when it is strange, unexpected, intense, superlative, extreme, unique, *etc.* [This "*etc.*" is quite interesting.] A thing is classical, on the other hand, when it is not unique, but representative of a class." The classical being reasonable in Professor Babbitt's opinion, the romantic may be conceived as either above or below reason. Professor Babbitt never considers any possibility of Romanticism being anywhere but below; it is "instinct" (p. 147),<sup>2</sup> and Rousseau and Romanticism are therefore condemnable. Now first of all, let us not forget that the notion of "reasonable" is subjective; for, although abstractly speaking it may be impersonal, as a matter of fact the reasonable never comes to us except as conceived by some individual; and therefore the "reasonable" of the classics, or of Aristotle—or of Professor Babbitt—may be legitimately thought of as surpassable. This being the case, we are inclined to think that Professor Babbitt would have been well inspired in following Goethe's saying (recalled by himself on p. 32), "Voltaire is the end of the old world, Rousseau is the beginning of the new." How unwarranted for a man, because he does not believe in Romanticism, to quietly say to one century and a half of human history: "There is no such thing as romantic morality" (p. 217). This beats all fanaticism from Mohammedism to Inquisitionism and Prussianism and Bolshevism. Even if one disapproves of the new world as it turned out to be, it is strange policy to try, as Professor Babbitt seems to do, to deny the very possibility of a new order of things. Says Professor Babbitt:

<sup>2</sup> Of course Rousseau used the word *instinct* in connection *e. g.* with moral conscience; but in his time the word had by no means the low materialistic connotation which it has to-day and of which Professor Babbitt takes advantage.

"Ovid sums up the classic point of view when he says one can not desire the unknown (*ignoti nulla cupido*)" (pp. 92-93). With all the reverence due to Professor Babbitt's authority, this is a very questionable statement. Why not an *ignoti cupido*? Did not St. Paul in Athens testify to some Unknown God, and was not St. Paul justified in announcing a new world with Christ? He was the romantic of his age, was he not? Now there can be no doubt that by the end of the eighteenth century there was started a new great *ignoti cupido*, which no decorum, or reason, or common sense could stop, and which must be added to the Aristotelian *gnotum*, and even to the Christian *gnotum* as far as this had developed—an *ignotum* which gradually is taking a more definite form from Rousseau to modern times. Even Professor Babbitt must admit that it exists since he attacks it; and if so would it not be altogether wiser to try to understand what there may be in it and then guide the movement, rather than to deny its right to existence. It takes more dogmatism than we care to refute here, to maintain that humanity went backward owing to the advent of Romanticism. The so-called cult of the Ego is taken in a most narrow sense by Professor Babbitt; he is blind to all that is not disagreeable flavor and vanity in it—a flavor which is very often, but not necessarily, associated with it.

If one does not choose to assume *only* the critical attitude, one may say that Romanticism has brought two distinctly good things. The first is the world reverence for the superior individual egos of men like Byron, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Vigny, Musset, *etc.* We would be quite willing to adopt the "classic" *consensus gentium* to support the view that posterity was right in admiring these geniuses for their greatness, and Professor Babbitt wrong in abusing them for their shortcomings. The second thing—which is even far more important: Romanticism taught us reverence for the impersonal ego, *i. e.*, the doctrine that, morally speaking, all the egos ought to have the same opportunities to show, whenever there is in them something worth showing. Rousseau and Victor Hugo specially were inspired by a profound sense of justice when they maintained that the social order was unduly crushing many excellent people; and Professor Babbitt is, I fear, terribly wrong when he thinks that Kaiserism was the product of Romanticism: it looks to most of us as a shocking anachronism; Wilhelm Hohenzollern was what we know, not because of, but in spite of Romanticism—and the whole world rose filled with Rousseauistic and Romantic fury against that revival of ante-revolutionary cynicism. Professor Babbitt pokes fun at Victor Hugo's exaggeration, and the exaggerations of all the Romanticists who idealized bandits and the scum of society. But this was simply an emphatic, dramatic, powerful affirmation of this theory, almost new



at the time, that men must be judged at their actual value, not from their appearances, their social rank, or their riches. The whole gallery of V. Hugo's "*monstres*," with their saving divine souls, the bandit, the convict, the courtesan, the grand style criminals, down to the physical monsters like Quasimodo, Bug Jargal, Han d'Islande—as opposed to the corrupt ecclesiastics, the fiendish noblemen, the despicable kings—were characters necessarily overdone in order to bring home to the new society the romantic gospel; just as Prometheus, and Antigone, and Le Cid were overdone classical characters, in fact "*monsters*" in the broad sense which H. Hugo had in mind when he said that the creation of monsters was a "satisfaction due to the infinite." Professor Babbitt may heap *Rousseau and Romanticism* on top of *The New Laocoön*, and *Masters of Modern Criticism* on top of *Literature and the American Colleges*, like Pelion on top of Ossa, but he will not displace Jean Valjean of the *Les Misérables* as impersonating the new gospel of Romanticism and of the world; and if one talks of "menace to civilization" by Rousseau and Romanticism, all depends upon what is meant by civilization. We may not admire the prostitute or the thief, but we must be willing to admit that old-fashioned social justice has too often forced some men to steal, that modern penitentiary systems still exist which prevent regeneration, while the system of wages has to this day forced many women to the street. Would it be too severe to say that Professor Babbitt, running away from Romanticism so as not to hear the plea of the many unfortunate "*romantics*," reminds one of Romain Rolland taking refuge in Geneva to tell the French that they were wrong in not extending their hands to the Germans and that, by resisting them, they prolonged the hatred between nations? All the books of Professor Babbitt will not convince us that the modern world was wrong when it was willing to favor perhaps a few real bandits, or a few Madam Bovarys, or a few Joseph Prudhommes (or even the vanity of Chateaubriand or Byron) for the sake of trying to obtain for many who were crushed by society, the right to live a higher life.

ALBERT SCHINZ.

SMITH COLLEGE.

## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. May, 1919. *A Schematic Outline of the Emotions* (pp. 165-196): JOHN B. WATSON.—Hard and fast definitions are not possible in the psychology of emotion, but formulations help to assemble facts. A formulation which will fit a part of the emotional group of reactions may be stated as follows: An emotion is an hereditary pattern-reaction involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the